Update README.md

README.md

@@ -100,19 +100,10 @@ view when Alice sends a message to Carol instead.
 - Ephemeral session keys ($epk_{i,j}$, $esk_{i,j}$) are generated by a client for each $P_i$ in the $j$-th position in an onion's routing path. They are short-term, meaning a processing party $P_i$ can only compute the shared secret during round $j$.
     - **Onion formation**: The client uses $esk_{i,j}$ and $P_i$'s public key $pk_i$ to generate a shared secret $s_{i,j}$.
       - The client includes $epk_{i,j}$ in the $j$-th layer's header.
-    - **Peeling**: The processing party $P_i$ uses $epk_{i,j}$ and its own private key $sk_i$ to compute the shared secret $s_{i,j}$.
+    - **Peeling**: The processing party $P_i$ uses the [ ephemeral public key $`epk_{i,j}`$ ](#epk) and its own private key $sk_i$ to compute the shared secret $s_{i,j}$.
       - $s_{i,j}$ is then used by the processing party to decrypt the header's [ ciphertext $`E_i`$ ](#Ei)
 - See [internal/pi_t/keys/ecdh.go](internal/pi_t/tools/keys/ecdh.go) for this project's ECDH usage.
 
-<div style="color: red;">TODO: update this:</div>
-
-- These shared keys are used (by the client during onion formation, and by a node when it processes the onion at layer $j$)   
-  for each hop $j$ in the path with pseudorandom functions $F1(sk_{i,k}, j)$ and $F2(sk_{i,k}, j)$.
-  - **$F1(sk_{i,k}, j)$**: If the result is 1, then a checkpoint onion is expected to be received by $P_i$   
-    at hop $j$ and $y$ = $F2(sk_{i,k}, j)$ is used to calculate the expected nonce of that checkpoint onion.
-    - See [internal/pi_t/prf/prf.go](/internal/pi_t/tools/prf/prf.go) for `PRF_F1` and `PRF_F2` implementations.
-- **Checkpoints ($Y_k$)**: The set of expected nonces (calculated by _F2_) for the $k$-th layer checkpoint onions.
-
 
 ### Tulip Bulb Structure:
 
@@ -372,9 +363,6 @@ view when Alice sends a message to Carol instead.
 
 ### 3. Mixing and Bruising:
 
-<div style="color: red;">TODO: update this:</div>
-
-```markdown
 - When a Mixer receives an onion and decrypts its outer layer (header), it reveals the following data:
   - Multiple key slots that contain copies of the decryption key. If an onion is bruised, one of these key slots is invalidated.
   - The nonce (decrypted using the session key shared with the original sender).
@@ -390,7 +378,6 @@ view when Alice sends a message to Carol instead.
 - The onion is then forwarded to the next node in the path.
 - The number of protection layers is managed in a way that does not reveal any positional information. For instance,   
   additional dummy layers might be used to mask the actual number of active layers.
-```
 
 ### 4. Intermediate Nodes: