-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
/
references.bib
762 lines (705 loc) · 54.5 KB
/
references.bib
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
@article{bai_employment_2020,
title = {Employment {Protection}, {Investment}, and {Firm} {Growth}},
volume = {33},
issn = {08939454, 14657368},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/48569450},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhz066},
abstract = {[We exploit the adoption of U.S. state-level labor protection laws to study the effect of employment protection on corporate investment rates and sales growth. We find that, following the adoption of these laws, capital expenditures as a percentage of book assets decrease, resulting in slower sales growth. Our findings are consistent with theories predicting that greater employment protection discourages investment by making projects more irreversible. Supporting this channel, following negative cash flow shocks, firms are less likely to downsize operations in states that have adopted these laws but more likely to downsize in states that have not adopted these laws.]},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-04-01},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
author = {Bai, John (Jianqiu) and Fairhurst, Douglas and Serfling, Matthew},
year = {2020},
pages = {644--488},
}
@article{barber_subpenny_2024,
title = {A ({Sub})penny for {Your} {Thoughts}: {Tracking} {Retail} {Investor} {Activity} in {TAQ}},
issn = {1540-6261},
shorttitle = {A ({Sub})penny for {Your} {Thoughts}},
url = {https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13334},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13334},
abstract = {We placed 85,000 retail trades in six retail brokerage accounts from December 2021 to June 2022 to validate the Boehmer et al. algorithm, which uses subpenny trade prices to identify and sign retail trades. The algorithm identifies 35\% of our trades as retail, incorrectly signs 28\% of identified trades, and yields uninformative order imbalance measures for 30\% of stocks. We modify the algorithm by signing trades using the quoted spread midpoints. The quote midpoint method does not affect identification rates but reduces the signing error rates to 5\% and provides informative order imbalance measures for all stocks.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2024-06-23},
year = {forthcoming},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Barber, Brad M. and Huang, Xing and Jorion, Philippe and Odean, Terrance and Schwarz, Christopher},
}
@article{beck_bank_2013,
title = {Bank competition and stability: {Cross}-country heterogeneity},
volume = {22},
issn = {1042-9573},
shorttitle = {Bank competition and stability},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957312000344},
doi = {10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001},
abstract = {This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’ fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. The effects are economically large and thus have important repercussions for the current regulatory reform debate.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-23},
journal = {Journal of Financial Intermediation},
author = {Beck, Thorsten and De Jonghe, Olivier and Schepens, Glenn},
month = apr,
year = {2013},
keywords = {Bank competition, Deposit insurance, Financial stability, Herding, Information sharing, Risk shifting},
pages = {218--244},
}
@article{berger_bank_2009,
title = {Bank {Competition} and {Financial} {Stability}},
volume = {35},
issn = {1573-0735},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-008-0050-7},
doi = {10.1007/s10693-008-0050-7},
abstract = {Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-23},
journal = {Journal of Financial Services Research},
author = {Berger, Allen N. and Klapper, Leora F. and Turk-Ariss, Rima},
month = apr,
year = {2009},
keywords = {Bank competition, Banking system fragility, F30, Financial stability, G21, G38, L89, Regulation},
pages = {99--118},
}
@article{bharath_forecasting_2008,
title = {Forecasting {Default} with the {Merton} {Distance} to {Default} {Model}},
volume = {21},
issn = {0893-9454},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn044},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhn044},
abstract = {We examine the accuracy and contribution of the Merton distance to default (DD) model, which is based on Merton's (1974) bond pricing model. We compare the model to a “naïve” alternative, which uses the functional form suggested by the Merton model but does not solve the model for an implied probability of default. We find that the naïve predictor performs slightly better in hazard models and in out-of-sample forecasts than both the Merton DD model and a reduced-form model that uses the same inputs. Several other forecasting variables are also important predictors, and fitted values from an expanded hazard model outperform Merton DD default probabilities out of sample. Implied default probabilities from credit default swaps and corporate bond yield spreads are only weakly correlated with Merton DD probabilities after adjusting for agency ratings and bond characteristics. We conclude that while the Merton DD model does not produce a sufficient statistic for the probability of default, its functional form is useful for forecasting defaults.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
author = {Bharath, Sreedhar T. and Shumway, Tyler},
month = may,
year = {2008},
pages = {1339--1369},
}
@article{black_scholes_1973,
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831029},
abstract = {If options are correctly priced in the market, it should not be possible to make sure profits by creating portfolios of long and short positions in options and their underlying stocks. Using this principle, a theoretical valuation formula for options is derived. Since almost all corporate liabilities can be viewed as combinations of options, the formula and the analysis that led to it are also applicable to corporate liabilities such as common stock, corporate bonds, and warrants. In particular, the formula can be used to derive the discount that should be applied to a corporate bond because of the possibility of default.},
author = {Fischer Black and Myron Scholes},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
number = {3},
pages = {637--654},
title = {The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities},
volume = {81},
year = {1973}
}
@article{boehmer_tracking_2021,
title = {Tracking {Retail} {Investor} {Activity}},
volume = {76},
issn = {0022-1082},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13033},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13033},
abstract = {ABSTRACT We provide an easy method to identify marketable retail purchases and sales using recent, publicly available U.S. equity transactions data. Individual stocks with net buying by retail investors outperform stocks with negative imbalances by approximately 10 bps over the following week. Less than half of the predictive power of marketable retail order imbalance is attributable to order flow persistence, while the rest cannot be explained by contrarian trading (proxy for liquidity provision) or public news sentiment. There is suggestive, but only suggestive, evidence that retail marketable orders might contain firm-level information that is not yet incorporated into prices.},
number = {5},
urldate = {2024-03-30},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Boehmer, Ekkehart and Jones, Charles M. and Zhang, Xiaoyan and Zhang, Xinran},
month = oct,
year = {2021},
pages = {2249--2305},
}
@article{bollerslev_modelling_1990,
title = {Modelling the {Coherence} in {Short}-{Run} {Nominal} {Exchange} {Rates}: {A} {Multivariate} {Generalized} {Arch} {Model}},
volume = {72},
issn = {0034-6535},
shorttitle = {Modelling the {Coherence} in {Short}-{Run} {Nominal} {Exchange} {Rates}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2109358},
doi = {10.2307/2109358},
abstract = {A multivariate time series model with time varying conditional variances and covariances, but constant conditional correlations is proposed. In a multivariate regression framework, the model is readily interpreted as an extension of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model allowing for heteroskedasticity. Parameterizing each of the conditional variances as a univariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) process, the descriptive validity of the model is illustrated for a set of five nominal European U.S. dollar exchange rates following the inception of the European Monetary System (EMS). When compared to the pre-EMS free float period, the comovements between the currencies are found to be significantly higher over the later period.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
author = {Bollerslev, Tim},
year = {1990},
pages = {498--505},
}
@article{callaway_2021,
series = {Themed {Issue}: {Treatment} {Effect} 1},
title = {Difference-in-{Differences} with multiple time periods},
volume = {225},
issn = {0304-4076},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407620303948},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.12.001},
abstract = {In this article, we consider identification, estimation, and inference procedures for treatment effect parameters using Difference-in-Differences (DiD) with (i) multiple time periods, (ii) variation in treatment timing, and (iii) when the “parallel trends assumption” holds potentially only after conditioning on observed covariates. We show that a family of causal effect parameters are identified in staggered DiD setups, even if differences in observed characteristics create non-parallel outcome dynamics between groups. Our identification results allow one to use outcome regression, inverse probability weighting, or doubly-robust estimands. We also propose different aggregation schemes that can be used to highlight treatment effect heterogeneity across different dimensions as well as to summarize the overall effect of participating in the treatment. We establish the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimators and prove the validity of a computationally convenient bootstrap procedure to conduct asymptotically valid simultaneous (instead of pointwise) inference. Finally, we illustrate the relevance of our proposed tools by analyzing the effect of the minimum wage on teen employment from 2001–2007. Open-source software is available for implementing the proposed methods.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
author = {Callaway, Brantly and Sant’Anna, Pedro H. C.},
month = dec,
year = {2021},
keywords = {Difference-in-Differences, Doubly robust, Dynamic treatment effects, Event study, Semi-parametric, Treatment effect heterogeneity, Variation in treatment timing},
pages = {200--230},
}
@article{cengiz_effect_2019,
title = {The {Effect} of {Minimum} {Wages} on {Low}-{Wage} {Jobs}*},
volume = {134},
issn = {0033-5533},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz014},
doi = {10.1093/qje/qjz014},
abstract = {We estimate the effect of minimum wages on low-wage jobs using 138 prominent state-level minimum wage changes between 1979 and 2016 in the United States using a difference-in-differences approach. We first estimate the effect of the minimum wage increase on employment changes by wage bins throughout the hourly wage distribution. We then focus on the bottom part of the wage distribution and compare the number of excess jobs paying at or slightly above the new minimum wage to the missing jobs paying below it to infer the employment effect. We find that the overall number of low-wage jobs remained essentially unchanged over the five years following the increase. At the same time, the direct effect of the minimum wage on average earnings was amplified by modest wage spillovers at the bottom of the wage distribution. Our estimates by detailed demographic groups show that the lack of job loss is not explained by labor-labor substitution at the bottom of the wage distribution. We also find no evidence of disemployment when we consider higher levels of minimum wages. However, we do find some evidence of reduced employment in tradeable sectors. We also show how decomposing the overall employment effect by wage bins allows a transparent way of assessing the plausibility of estimates.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Cengiz, Doruk and Dube, Arindrajit and Lindner, Attila and Zipperer, Ben},
month = aug,
year = {2019},
pages = {1405--1454},
}
@article{crosbie_modeling_2003,
title = {Modeling {Default} {Risk}},
abstract = {Default risk is the uncertainty surrounding a firm's ability to service its debts and obligations. Prior to default, there is no way to discriminate unambiguously between firms that will default and those that won't. At best we can only make probabilistic assessments of the likelihood of default. As a result, firms generally pay a spread over the default-free rate of interest that is proportional to their default probability to compensate lenders for this uncertainty.},
language = {en},
author = {Crosbie, Peter and Bohn, Jeffery},
year = {2003},
}
@article{deshpande_who_2019,
title = {Who {Is} {Screened} {Out}? {Application} {Costs} and the {Targeting} of {Disability} {Programs}},
volume = {11},
issn = {1945-7731},
shorttitle = {Who {Is} {Screened} {Out}?},
url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20180076},
doi = {10.1257/pol.20180076},
abstract = {We study the effect of application costs on the targeting of disability programs. We identify these effects using the closings of Social Security Administration field offices, which provide assistance with filing disability applications. Closings lead to a persistent 16 percent decline in the number of disability recipients in surrounding areas, with the largest effects for applicants with moderately severe conditions and low education levels. Disability applications fall by only 10 percent, implying that the closings reduce targeting efficiency based on current eligibility standards. Increased congestion at neighboring offices appears more important as a channel than higher travel or information costs.},
language = {en},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
author = {Deshpande, Manasi and Li, Yue},
month = nov,
year = {2019},
keywords = {Economics of the Handicapped, Non-labor Market Discrimination, Public Health, Economics of the Elderly, Regulation, Social Security and Public Pensions, Health Insurance, Public and Private, Health: Government Policy},
pages = {213--248},
}
@article{easley_liquidity_1996,
title = {Liquidity, {Information}, and {Infrequently} {Traded} {Stocks}},
volume = {51},
copyright = {© 1996 the American Finance Association},
issn = {1540-6261},
doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04074.x},
abstract = {This article investigates whether differences in information-based trading can explain observed differences in spreads for active and infrequently traded stocks. Using a new empirical technique, we estimate the risk of information-based trading for a sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks. We use the information in trade data to determine how frequently new information occurs, the composition of trading when it does, and the depth of the market for different volume-decile stocks. Our most important empirical result is that the probability of information-based trading is lower for high volume stocks. Using regressions, we provide evidence of the economic importance of information-based trading on spreads.},
language = {en},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Easley, David and Kiefer, Nicholas M. and O'hara, Maureen and Paperman, Joseph B.},
year = {1996},
pages = {1405--1436},
}
@article{edmans_executive_2016,
title = {Executive {Compensation}: {A} {Modern} {Primer}},
volume = {54},
issn = {0022-0515},
shorttitle = {Executive {Compensation}},
url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20161153},
doi = {10.1257/jel.20161153},
abstract = {This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that compensation results from "rent extraction" by CEOs. However, more modern "shareholder value" theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research.},
language = {en},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
author = {Edmans, Alex and Gabaix, Xavier},
month = dec,
year = {2016},
keywords = {Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation, Personnel Management, Executive Compensation, Accounting and Auditing: Government Policy and Regulation, Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, Executives},
pages = {1232--1287},
}
@article{eisfeldt_organization_2013,
title = {Organization {Capital} and the {Cross}-{Section} of {Expected} {Returns}},
volume = {68},
issn = {0022-1082},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12034},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.12034},
abstract = {ABSTRACT Organization capital is a production factor that is embodied in the firm's key talent and has an efficiency that is firm specific. Hence, both shareholders and key talent have a claim to its cash flows. We develop a model in which the outside option of the key talent determines the share of firm cash flows that accrue to shareholders. This outside option varies systematically and renders firms with high organization capital riskier from shareholders' perspective. We find that firms with more organization capital have average returns that are 4.6\% higher than firms with less organization capital.},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-04-01},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Eisfeldt, Andrea L. and Papanikolaou, Dimitris},
month = aug,
year = {2013},
pages = {1365--1406},
}
@article{engle_autoregressive_1982,
title = {Autoregressive {Conditional} {Heteroscedasticity} with {Estimates} of the {Variance} of {United} {Kingdom} {Inflation}},
volume = {50},
issn = {0012-9682},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1912773},
doi = {10.2307/1912773},
abstract = {Traditional econometric models assume a constant one-period forecast variance. To generalize this implausible assumption, a new class of stochastic processes called autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) processes are introduced in this paper. These are mean zero, serially uncorrelated processes with nonconstant variances conditional on the past, but constant unconditional variances. For such processes, the recent past gives information about the one-period forecast variance. A regression model is then introduced with disturbances following an ARCH process. Maximum likelihood estimators are described and a simple scoring iteration formulated. Ordinary least squares maintains its optimality properties in this set-up, but maximum likelihood is more efficient. The relative efficiency is calculated and can be infinite. To test whether the disturbances follow an ARCH process, the Lagrange multiplier procedure is employed. The test is based simply on the autocorrelation of the squared OLS residuals. This model is used to estimate the means and variances of inflation in the U.K. The ARCH effect is found to be significant and the estimated variances increase substantially during the chaotic seventies.},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Engle, Robert F.},
year = {1982},
pages = {987--1007},
}
@article{gao_organization_2021,
title = {Organization capital and executive performance incentives},
volume = {123},
copyright = {All rights reserved},
issn = {0378-4266},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426620302788},
doi = {10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.106017},
abstract = {We conjecture that a firm's organization capital (OC) has a substitution effect on its executive pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and empirically document a robust and significant substitution effect of OC on executive PPS. We use state-level unemployment insurance benefits as an instrumental variable for OC and show that the documented OC-PPS substitution effect is likely causal. Results are also robust to a stacked difference-in-differences estimation approach based on a quasi-natural experiment of exogenous CEO turnovers due to health-related issues. Our findings strongly suggest that greater OC substitutes for costly executive incentive compensation to sustain firm productivity and increase shareholder wealth.},
journal = {Journal of Banking \& Finance},
author = {Gao, Mingze and Leung, Henry and Qiu, Buhui},
year = {2021},
keywords = {Organization capital, Executive pay-for-performance sensitivity},
pages = {106017},
}
@article{goodman-bacon_2021,
series = {Themed {Issue}: {Treatment} {Effect} 1},
title = {Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing},
volume = {225},
issn = {0304-4076},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407621001445},
doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2021.03.014},
abstract = {The canonical difference-in-differences (DD) estimator contains two time periods, ”pre” and ”post”, and two groups, ”treatment” and ”control”. Most DD applications, however, exploit variation across groups of units that receive treatment at different times. This paper shows that the two-way fixed effects estimator equals a weighted average of all possible two-group/two-period DD estimators in the data. A causal interpretation of two-way fixed effects DD estimates requires both a parallel trends assumption and treatment effects that are constant over time. I show how to decompose the difference between two specifications, and provide a new analysis of models that include time-varying controls.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
author = {Goodman-Bacon, Andrew},
month = dec,
year = {2021},
keywords = {Difference-in-differences, Treatment effect heterogeneity, Two-way fixed effects, Variation in treatment timing},
pages = {254--277},
}
@article{gormley_growing_2011,
title = {Growing {Out} of {Trouble}? {Corporate} {Responses} to {Liability} {Risk}},
volume = {24},
issn = {0893-9454},
shorttitle = {Growing {Out} of {Trouble}?},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr011},
doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhr011},
abstract = {This article analyzes corporate responses to the liability risk arising from workers' exposure to newly identified carcinogens. We find that firms, especially those with weak balance sheets, tend to respond to such risks by acquiring large, unrelated businesses with relatively high operating cash flows. The diversifying growth appears to be primarily motivated by managers' personal exposure to their firms' risk in that the growth has negative announcement returns and is related to firms' external governance, managerial stockholdings, and institutional ownership. The results suggest that corporate governance is particularly important when firms are exposed to the risk of large, adverse shocks.},
number = {8},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Review of Financial Studies},
author = {Gormley, Todd A. and Matsa, David A.},
month = aug,
year = {2011},
pages = {2781--2821},
}
@article{gormley_ceo_2013,
series = {Conference {Issue} on {Accounting} {Research} on {Classic} and {Contemporary} {Issues}},
title = {{CEO} compensation and corporate risk: {Evidence} from a natural experiment},
volume = {56},
issn = {0165-4101},
shorttitle = {{CEO} compensation and corporate risk},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410113000505},
doi = {10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.08.001},
abstract = {This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by exploiting an unanticipated change in firms' business risks. The natural experiment provides an opportunity to examine two classic questions related to incentives and risk—how boards adjust incentives in response to firms' risk and how these incentives affect managers' risk-taking. We find that, after left-tail risk increases, boards reduce managers' exposure to stock price movements and that less convexity from options-based pay leads to greater risk-reducing activities. Specifically, managers with less convex payoffs tend to cut leverage and R\&D, stockpile cash, and engage in more diversifying acquisitions.},
number = {2, Supplement 1},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Accounting and Economics},
author = {Gormley, Todd A. and Matsa, David A. and Milbourn, Todd},
month = dec,
year = {2013},
keywords = {Compensation, Legal liability, Managerial incentives, Regulatory risk, Stock options, Tail risk},
pages = {79--101},
}
@article{holmstrom_aggregation_1987,
title = {Aggregation and {Linearity} in the {Provision} of {Intertemporal} {Incentives}},
volume = {55},
issn = {0012-9682},
url = {https://www.jstor.org.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/stable/1913238},
doi = {10.2307/1913238},
abstract = {We consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion. The optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of N accounts which count the number of times that each of the N kinds of observable events occurs. The number N is independent of the number of time periods, so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation. In a continuous time version of the problem, the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent, small random fluctuations. The solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule. If the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates, such as revenues, costs, or profits, the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates. The combination of exponential utility, normal distributions, and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do, as we illustrate. We interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent's strategy space, which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated, nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Econometrica},
author = {Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul},
year = {1987},
pages = {303--328},
}
@article{jones_earnings_1991,
title = {Earnings {Management} {During} {Import} {Relief} {Investigations}},
volume = {29},
issn = {0021-8456},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2491047},
doi = {10.2307/2491047},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
author = {Jones, Jennifer J.},
year = {1991},
pages = {193--228},
}
@article{koetter_enjoying_2012,
title = {Enjoying the {Quiet} {Life} under {Deregulation}? {Evidence} from {Adjusted} {Lerner} {Indices} for {U}.{S}. {Banks}},
volume = {94},
issn = {0034-6535},
shorttitle = {Enjoying the {Quiet} {Life} under {Deregulation}?},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00155},
doi = {10.1162/REST_a_00155},
abstract = {The quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents. We propose a simple adjustment to Lerner indices to account for the possibility of forgone rents to test this hypothesis. For a large sample of U.S. commercial banks, we find that adjusted Lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional Lerner indices and trending upward over time. Instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies. However, Lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among U.S. banks.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-23},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
author = {Koetter, Michael and Kolari, James W. and Spierdijk, Laura},
month = may,
year = {2012},
pages = {462--480},
}
@article{kothari_performance_2005,
title = {Performance matched discretionary accrual measures},
volume = {39},
issn = {0165-4101},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410104000849},
doi = {10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002},
abstract = {We examine the specification and power of tests based on performance-matched discretionary accruals, and make comparisons with tests using traditional discretionary accrual measures (e.g., Jones and modified-Jones models). Performance matching on return on assets controls for the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals. The results suggest that performance-matched discretionary accrual measures enhance the reliability of inferences from earnings management research when the hypothesis being tested does not imply that earnings management will vary with performance, or where the control firms are not expected to have engaged in earnings management.},
number = {1},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Accounting and Economics},
author = {Kothari, S. P. and Leone, Andrew J. and Wasley, Charles E.},
month = feb,
year = {2005},
keywords = {Discretionary accruals, Discretionary-accruals models, Earnings management, Performance matching},
pages = {163--197},
}
@article{li_organization_2018,
title = {Organization {Capital} and {Mergers} and {Acquisitions}},
volume = {53},
issn = {00221090, 17566916},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/26592002},
abstract = {[Using a sample of completed U.S. acquisition deals over the period 1984–2014, we find that acquirer organization capital as measured by capitalized selling, general, and administrative (SG\&A) expenses is associated with superior deal performance. We show that high organization-capital acquirers achieve significantly higher abnormal announcement period returns, and better post-merger operating and stock performance, than low organization-capital acquirers. Additional tests suggest a causal relation between acquirer organization capital and deal performance. We further show that post-merger, high organization-capital acquirers cut more on the cost of goods sold, invest more in SG\&A expenses, and achieve greater asset turnover and innovative efficiency.]},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-06-20},
journal = {The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
author = {Li, Kai and Qiu, Buhui and Shen, Rui},
year = {2018},
pages = {1871--1909},
}
@article{merton_pricing_1974,
title = {On the {Pricing} of {Corporate} {Debt}: {The} {Risk} {Structure} of {Interest} {Rates}*},
volume = {29},
copyright = {© 1974 the American Finance Association},
issn = {1540-6261},
shorttitle = {On the {Pricing} of {Corporate} {Debt}},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x},
doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Merton, Robert C.},
year = {1974},
pages = {449--470},
}
@article{nini_creditor_2009,
title = {Creditor control rights and firm investment policy},
volume = {92},
issn = {0304-405X},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X09000233},
doi = {10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.04.008},
abstract = {We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32\% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Journal of Financial Economics},
author = {Nini, Greg and Smith, David C. and Sufi, Amir},
month = jun,
year = {2009},
keywords = {Capital expenditures, Covenants, Financial constraints, Investment},
pages = {400--420},
}
@article{shaffer_measuring_2020,
title = {Measuring multi-product banks’ market power using the {Lerner} index},
volume = {117},
issn = {0378-4266},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426620301254},
doi = {10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105859},
abstract = {The aggregate Lerner index is a popular composite measure of multi-product banks’ market power, based on total assets as the single aggregate output factor. We show that the aggregate Lerner index only qualifies as a consistently aggregated Lerner index if three conditions hold. Under these conditions, the aggregate Lerner index reduces to a weighted-average of the product-specific Lerner indices. We test the three conditions for a sample of U.S. banks covering the years 2011–2017. All three conditions are rejected and we show that they may cause an economically relevant bias to the aggregate Lerner index, depending on the economic context. As a general solution, we propose using the always consistently aggregated weighted-average Lerner index whenever a composite Lerner index is needed.},
urldate = {2024-06-23},
journal = {Journal of Banking \& Finance},
author = {Shaffer, Sherrill and Spierdijk, Laura},
month = aug,
year = {2020},
keywords = {Cost functions, Lerner index, Market power, Multi-product banks},
pages = {105859},
}
@article{simonsohn_specification_2020,
title = {Specification curve analysis},
volume = {4},
issn = {2397-3374},
url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0912-z},
doi = {10.1038/s41562-020-0912-z},
language = {en},
number = {11},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {Nature Human Behaviour},
author = {Simonsohn, Uri and Simmons, Joseph P. and Nelson, Leif D.},
month = jul,
year = {2020},
pages = {1208--1214},
}
@article{vassalou_default_2004,
title = {Default {Risk} in {Equity} {Returns}},
volume = {59},
copyright = {© 2004 the American Finance Association},
issn = {1540-6261},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00650.x},
doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00650.x},
abstract = {This is the first study that uses Merton's (1974) option pricing model to compute default measures for individual firms and assess the effect of default risk on equity returns. The size effect is a default effect, and this is also largely true for the book-to-market (BM) effect. Both exist only in segments of the market with high default risk. Default risk is systematic risk. The Fama–French (FF) factors SMB and HML contain some default-related information, but this is not the main reason that the FF model can explain the cross section of equity returns.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Vassalou, Maria and Xing, Yuhang},
year = {2004},
pages = {831--868},
}
@book{wooldridge_econometric_2010,
title = {Econometric {Analysis} of {Cross} {Section} and {Panel} {Data}},
isbn = {978-0-262-23258-6},
urldate = {2024-06-24},
publisher = {The MIT Press},
author = {Wooldridge, Jefrey M.},
year = {2010},
}
@article{zardkoohi_homogeneity_1986,
title = {Homogeneity {Restrictions} on the {Translog} {Cost} {Model}: {A} {Note}},
volume = {41},
issn = {0022-1082},
shorttitle = {Homogeneity {Restrictions} on the {Translog} {Cost} {Model}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2328171},
doi = {10.2307/2328171},
number = {5},
urldate = {2024-06-23},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
author = {Zardkoohi, Asghar and Rangan, Nanda and Kolari, James},
year = {1986},
pages = {1153--1155},
}
% Teaching
@BOOK{Merton1993,
title = "Operation and Regulation in Financial Intermediation: A
Functional Perspective",
author = "Merton, R C",
editor = "Englund, P",
publisher = "Stockholm: Economic Council",
year = 1993,
}
@ARTICLE{Holmstrom1997,
title = "Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector",
author = "Holmstrom, Bengt and Tirole, Jean",
abstract = "[We study an incentive model of financial intermediation in
which firms as well as intermediaries are capital constrained.
We analyze how the distribution of wealth across firms,
intermediaries, and uninformed investors affects investment,
interest rates, and the intensity of monitoring. We show that
all forms of capital tightening (a credit crunch, a collateral
squeeze, or a savings squeeze) hit poorly capitalized firms the
hardest, but that interest rate effects and the intensity of
monitoring will depend on relative changes in the various
components of capital. The predictions of the model are broadly
consistent with the lending patterns observed during the recent
financial crises.]",
journal = "Quarterly Journal of Economics",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
volume = 112,
number = 3,
pages = "663--691",
year = 1997
}
@ARTICLE{Broecker1990,
title = "Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition",
author = "Broecker, Thorsten",
abstract = "This paper analyzes a competitive credit market where banks use
imperfect and independent tests to assess the ability of a
potential creditor to repay credit. The banks compete by
announcing interest rates at which they will provide credit to
those applicants who pass the banks' tests. The proportion of
applicants who pass the test of at least one bank increases with
the number of banks providing credit, so the average
credit-worthiness decreases. It is then shown that in a
situation where all banks charge the same interest rate, a bank
always has the incentive to undercut in order to improve the
average credit-worthiness of its own clientele. This feature
represents the major difference from the situations in standard
Bertrand and Bertrand-Edgeworth models. Copyright 1990 by The
Econometric Society.",
journal = "Econometrica",
publisher = "JSTOR",
volume = 58,
number = 2,
pages = "429",
month = mar,
year = 1990
}
@article{Diamond1983,
author = {Diamond, Douglas W. and Dybvig, Philip H.},
title = {Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {91},
number = {3},
pages = {401-419},
year = {1983},
}
@ARTICLE{Salop1979,
title = "Monopolistic competition with outside goods",
author = "Salop, Steven C",
abstract = "The Chamberlinian monopolistically competitive equilibrium has
been explored and extended in a number of recent papers. These
analyses have paid only cursory attention to the existence of an
industry outside the Chamberlinian group. In this article I
analyze a model of spatial competition in which a second
commodity is explicitly treated. In this two-industry economy, a
zero-profit equilibrium with symmetrically located firms may
exhibit rather strange properties. First, demand curves are
kinked although firms make ``Nash'' conjectures. If equilibrium
lies at the kink, the effects of parameter changes are perverse.
In the short run, prices are rigid in the face of small cost
changes. In the long run, increases in costs lower equilibrium
prices. Increases in market size raise prices. The welfare
properties are also perverse at a kinked equilibrium.",
journal = "The Bell Journal of Economics",
publisher = "JSTOR",
volume = 10,
number = 1,
pages = "141",
year = 1979
}
@article{Diamond1984,
author = {Diamond, Douglas W.},
title = {Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring},
journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
volume = {51},
number = {3},
pages = {393-414},
year = {1984},
month = {07},
abstract = "{This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.}",
issn = {0034-6527},
}
@ARTICLE{Modigliani1958,
title = "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment",
author = "Modigliani, F and Miller, M H",
journal = "The American Economic Review",
volume = 48,
number = 3,
pages = "261--297",
year = 1958
}
@ARTICLE{Bernanke1983,
title = "Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation
of the great depression",
author = "Bernanke, Ben S",
journal = "The American Economic Review",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
volume = 73,
number = 3,
pages = "257--276",
year = 1983
}
@ARTICLE{Fisher1933,
title = "The debt-deflation theory of great depressions",
author = "Fisher, Irving",
abstract = "IN Booms and Depressions, I have developed, theoretically and
statistically, what may be called a debt-deflation theory of
great depressions. In the preface, I stated that the results
``seem largely new,'' I spoke thus cautiously because of my
unfamiliarity with the vast literature on the subject. Since the
book was published its special conclusions have been widely
accepted and, so far as I know, no one has yet found them
anticipated by previous writers, though several, including
myself, have zealously sought to find such anticipations. Two of
the best-read authorities in this field assure me that those
conclusions are, in the words of one of them, ``both new and
important.'' Partly to specify what some of these special
conclusions are which are believed to be new and partly to fit
them into the conclusions of other students in this field, I am
offering this paper as embodying, in brief, my present ``creed''
on the whole subject of so-called ``cycle theory.'' My ``creed''
consists of 49 ``articles'' some of which are old and some new.
I say ``creed'' because, for brevity, it is purposely expressed
dogmatically and without proof. But it is not a creed in the
sense that my faith in it does not rest on evidence and that I
am not ready to modify it on presentation of new evidence. On
the contrary, it is quite tentative. It may serve as a challenge
to others and as raw material to help them work out a better
product. Meanwhile the following is a list of my 49 tentative
conclusions.",
journal = "Econometrica",
publisher = "JSTOR",
volume = 1,
number = 4,
pages = "337",
month = oct,
year = 1933
}
@article{hsu_natural_2018,
title = {Natural {Disasters}, {Technology} {Diversity}, and {Operating} {Performance}},
volume = {100},
issn = {0034-6535},
abstract = {In this paper, we empirically measure the impact of natural disasters on firm-level operating performance and examine if such impact can be mitigated by technology diversification. Using major natural disasters specified by Barrot and Sauvagnat (2015) and factory location data from the toxic release inventory (TRI) database, we first find that firms with factories located in states affected by natural disasters are much less profitable. Second, we find that firms with diversified technologies are significantly less subject to the impact of natural disasters, suggesting that technology diversity enhances firms’ sustainability.},
number = {4},
urldate = {2024-07-19},
journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
author = {Hsu, Po-Hsuan and Lee, Hsiao-Hui and Peng, Shu-Cing and Yi, Long},
year = {2018},
note = {Publisher: The MIT Press},
pages = {619--630},
}
@techreport{hall_2001,
title = "The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools",
author = "Hall, Bronwyn H and Jaffe, Adam B and Trajtenberg, Manuel",
institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
type = "Working Paper",
series = "Working Paper Series",
number = "8498",
year = "2001",
month = "October",
doi = {10.3386/w8498},
URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498",
abstract = {This paper describes the database on U.S. patents that we have developed over the past decade, with the goal of making it widely accessible for research. We present main trends in U. S. patenting over the last 30 years, including a variety of original measures constructed with citation data, such as backward and forward citation lags, indices of 'originality' and 'generality', self-citations, etc. Many of these measures exhibit interesting differences across the six main technological categories that we have developed (comprising Computers and Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronics, Chemical, Mechanical and Others), differences that call for further research. To stimulate such research, the entire database about 3 million patents and 16 million citations is now available on the NBER website. We discuss key issues that arise in the use of patent citations data, and suggest ways of addressing them. In particular, significant changes over time in the rate of patenting and in the number of citations made, as well as the inevitable truncation of the data, make it very hard to use the raw number of citations received by different patents directly in a meaningful way. To remedy this problem we suggest two alternative approaches: the fixed-effects approach involves scaling citations by the average citation count for a group of patents to which the patent of interest belongs; the quasi-structural approach attempts to distinguish the multiple effects on citation rates via econometric estimation.},
}
@article{kogan_technological_2017,
title = {Technological {Innovation}, {Resource} {Allocation}, and {Growth}*},
volume = {132},
issn = {0033-5533},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw040},
doi = {10.1093/qje/qjw040},
abstract = {We propose a new measure of the economic importance of each innovation. Our measure uses newly collected data on patents issued to U.S. firms in the 1926 to 2010 period, combined with the stock market response to news about patents. Our patent-level estimates of private economic value are positively related to the scientific value of these patents, as measured by the number of citations the patent receives in the future. Our new measure is associated with substantial growth, reallocation, and creative destruction, consistent with the predictions of Schumpeterian growth models. Aggregating our measure suggests that technological innovation accounts for significant medium-run fluctuations in aggregate economic growth and TFP. Our measure contains additional information relative to citation-weighted patent counts; the relation between our measure and firm growth is considerably stronger. Importantly, the degree of creative destruction that is associated with our measure is higher than previous estimates, confirming that it is a useful proxy for the private valuation of patents.},
number = {2},
urldate = {2024-07-19},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
author = {Kogan, Leonid and Papanikolaou, Dimitris and Seru, Amit and Stoffman, Noah},
month = may,
year = {2017},
pages = {665--712},
}
@article{miller_technological_diversity_2006,
URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20142362},
abstract = {Previous findings that related diversification creates value have been called into question over concerns about methodology and measures. Reviewing existing theory to consider how a firm's knowledge base interacts with its product market activity, I address several of these concerns by creating a measure of technological diversity based on citation-weighted patents. The measure indicates a firm's opportunity for corporate diversification based on economies of scope in valuable knowledge assets, is defined for both single- and multibusiness firms, and is not correlated with more fundamental aspects of diversification, such as the number of businesses in the corporate portfolio. Evidence from a large sample of firms shows the positive relationship between diversification based on technological diversity and market-based measures of performance, controlling for R&D intensity and capital intensity as further indicators of the type of assets underlying diversification. Results hold when controlling for the endogeneity of diversification and performance in a cross-sectional sample or when controlling for unobserved factors using panel data.},
author = {Douglas J. Miller},
journal = {Strategic Management Journal},
number = {7},
pages = {601--619},
title = {Technological Diversity, Related Diversification, and Firm Performance},
urldate = {2024-07-20},
volume = {27},
year = {2006}
}
@book{freixas_microeconomics_2023,
edition = {3},
title = {Microeconomics of {Banking}},
isbn = {978-0-262-04819-4},
abstract = {The third edition of a leading text on the microeconomic foundations of banking, comprehensively updated with new coverage of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, fintech, and the latest research in banking theory.The banking industry has undergone seismic change in the twenty-first century, from the overhaul of regulation in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis to the digitalization of the economy and the disruption of traditional business models by ascendant tech giants. Now in a comprehensively updated third edition, this essential graduate-level text on the microeconomic foundations of banking provides the rigorous theoretical approach required to understand these new structures and norms, functioning as a user’s guide to recent academic literature. Microeconomics of Banking offers a comprehensive view of the evolution of banking theory and the rapidly changing realm of financial intermediation, examining the central issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled. New edition highlights:Up-to-date coverage of the latest research in banking theory as well as the events of the global financial crisis and resultant Basel III regulatory frameworkNew chapters on liquidity and systemic riskNew material throughout on cryptocurrencies, fintech, and other facets of a digitalized economy},
language = {en},
publisher = {MIT Press},
author = {Freixas, Xavier and Rochet, Jean-Charles},
year = {2023},
keywords = {Business \& Economics / Banks \& Banking, Business \& Economics / Economics / Microeconomics, Business \& Economics / Money \& Monetary Policy},
}
@book{saunders_financial_2023,
edition = {11},
title = {Financial {Institutions} {Management} {ISE}},
isbn = {978-1-266-13822-5},
abstract = {Saunders and Cornett's Financial Institutions Management: A Risk Management Approach provides an innovative approach that focuses on managing return and risk in modern financial institutions. The central theme is that the risks faced by financial institutions managers and the methods and markets through which these risks are managed are becoming increasingly similar whether an institution is chartered as a commercial bank, a savings bank, an investment bank, or an insurance company. Although the traditional nature of each sector's product activity is analyzed, a greater emphasis is placed on new areas of activities such as asset securitization, off-balance-sheet banking, and international banking.},
language = {English},
publisher = {McGraw Hill},
author = {Saunders, Anthony and Cornett, Marcia Millon and Erhemjamts, Otgo},
year = {2023},
}